

# The Federalist Papers No. 10

*by James Madison*

Among the many advantages of a well-formed Union of all the States, none deserves more attention than its tendency to control violence among factions. By a faction I mean a number of citizens—either a majority of them or a minority of them—who group themselves together, and who are motivated by some common interest or cause. But this common interest or cause is opposed to and threatens the rights of other citizens, or the interests of the community as a whole.

There are two ways of removing the causes of faction. One of them is by destroying the freedom which is essential for faction to exist in the first place. The other way is to make sure that every citizen has the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

Nothing is more true than that the first cure—to destroy the freedom of everyone—is far worse than the disease—that is, factions fighting each other. Liberty is to faction as air is to fire. But it would be as foolish to destroy liberty, which is essential to healthy political life, as it would be to destroy air, which is necessary for any animal life, simply because it also allows fire to exist.

The second cure—to make sure every citizen has the same opinions—is impossible. As long as the reason of human beings continues to make mistakes sometimes, and people are free to use their reason, there will be different opinions on all kinds of matters. As long as the connection continues between one's reason and self-love, they will constantly affect each other.

So, that which lies behind the causes of faction is part of the very nature of mankind. The energy which produces different opinions concerning religion, government and

many other points, and which makes us follow different leaders—that same energy divides human beings into factions. It inflames them to dislike and hate one another. It makes them much more likely to oppress and fight one another than to work for their common good.

It is because of the energy of this self-love and self-interest that no one is allowed to be a judge in one's own cause. It is even more certain that a group of people—a faction—should not be lawmakers, judge, and jury in their own cause at the same time.

From this it follows that a pure democracy, by which I mean a small society who try to govern themselves in person, will never cure the evils of faction. The majority will always rule over, and oppress, the minority. But a republic, by which I mean a government in which a scheme of representation takes place, promises a cure we are looking for.

The two main differences between a democracy and a republic are: first, that in a republic, the government is a small number of citizens elected by all the citizens; second, a republic can extend over a very large country and very many citizens.

The effect of these differences is that the many different opinions of the masses from all over the country will be refined by passing them through the medium of the representatives, chosen by all the citizens. These representatives are more likely to be wise enough to see better the true interest of their country, and less likely to sacrifice it to some temporary considerations.

In the next place, in a large republic, each representative will be chosen by a large number of citizens, and so it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to cheat at getting elected. Again, since the people are more free, they will be more likely to elect a person of attractive and stable character.